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Abstract
The United Nations Security Council’s anti-terrorism regime constitutes a serious threat to the 
legitimacy and unity of the United Nations system as a whole. Recent European Court of Justice 
jurisprudence emphasises that Security Council resolutions which breach human rights norms 
will not be enforced by member states. The Security Council has insufficient internal checks to 
ensure that it passes resolutions which sufficiently respect human rights norms. Judicial review is 
therefore required on the part of the International Court of Justice to ensure that the Security 
Council passes resolutions which remain effective and do not bring the United Nations system 
into disrepute.
Introduction
Security Council resolutions regarding terrorism have been subject increasingly to the scrutiny of 
regional organisations, particularly EU courts. The most notable recent example is perhaps the 
Kadi[1] case in which the ECJ ruled that direct adoption of Security Council resolutions by 
European member states breached fundamental rights. It appears likely that the Security Council 
will be subject to increasingly frequent review by regional courts. It is submitted that such a trend 
creates a challenge to both the legitimacy and unity of the UN system.
To address this challenge, this article argues that the ICJ should assert the power of judicial 
review so that Security Council resolutions are reviewed within the UN system, rather than the 
UN as a whole being subject to external criticism. The article is argued from the perspective of 
the UN and assumes that it benefits the Organisation to uphold both the legitimacy and unity of 
the UN system. Part I considers the evolving role of the Security Council since the end of the 
Cold War. Part II examines the human rights limitations to which the Security Council is subject. 
Finally, Part III proposes a judicial review model for holding the Security Council to account. 
I: The Security Council’s Threat to the UN System
The Security Council has been described as “the most powerful multilateral political 
institution”	  [2], a particularly apt description since the end of the Cold War. Since then, both the 
Security Council and the resolutions it passes have changed profoundly:
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“In its first 44 years, 24 Security Council resolutions cited or used the enforcement 
powers contained in Chapter VII of the UN Charter; by 1993 the Council was 
adopting that many such resolutions every year. The Council has also expanded the 
range of its activities, including the establishment of international criminal tribunals, 
the maintenance of complex sanctions regimes, the protection of civilians, and the 
temporary administration of territory.” [3] 
Since 9/11, anti-terrorism resolutions have perhaps been the principal manifestations of the 
Security Council’s newfound authority. Anti-terrorism is an issue which unites disparate member 
states as, by definition, all non-state actors threaten the legitimacy of nation states and their 
governments. The international fluidity of terrorist movements which disregard national borders 
is a further incentive for co-operation: one reason for Russia’s condoning the US-led invasion of 
Afghanistan was awareness that Afghan terrorism also posed a threat to Russian security by 
destabilising Chechnya.	  [4] A number of these anti-terrorism resolutions are markedly different to 
those traditionally passed by the Security Council and raise concerns that the Security Council is 
acting in its own intergovernmental interest, not merely to the potential detriment of 
unrepresented member states, as in the 1990s, but also to the detriment of individual liberty. 
These resolutions can be broadly divided into those of a legislative and judicial character.
A. The Security Council as Legislator
Professor Stefan Talmon provides a definition for resolutions, which may be considered 
international legislation:
“The hallmark of any international legislation is the general and abstract character 
of the obligations imposed. These may well be triggered by a particular situation, 
conflict, or event, but they are not restricted to it. Rather, the obligations are phrased 
in neutral language, apply to an indefinite number of cases, and are not usually 
limited in time.” [5]
Resolution 1373 (2001), passed on 28th September 2001, is the archetypal legislation meeting 
this definition. It “[d]ecides that all States shall…” inter alia:
“Freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources of 
persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate 
the commission of terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly 
by such persons; and of persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of 
such persons and entities, including funds derived or generated from property owned 
or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons and associated persons and 
entities…”
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Given the primacy of the UN afforded to the Organisation in the Charter, member states are 
subject to a prima facie obligation to adhere to this resolution.	  [6] Such a resolution was 
revolutionary, especially given the judgment by the ICTY only six years previously that, “There 
is...no legislature, in the technical sense of the term, in the United Nations system...That is to say, 
there exists no corporate organ formally empowered to enact laws directly binding on 
international legal subjects.”	  [7] The impetus for this reversal was a combination of the Security 
Council’s ability to act through newfound consensus and the necessity of the Security Council to 
act due to the realisation, following 9/11, of the scale of threat which international terrorism 
posed. Security Council members required an immediate response to a sudden attack and the 
Council’s exercise of powers under Chapter VII provided “…the only available means of 
promptly producing general international law”.	  [8]
While the motivations for the Security Council’s producing such broad legislation are clear, the 
effects can be damaging. Such an example is India, an important case study for the ramifications 
of Security Council resolutions because it is the world’s most populous nation without permanent 
membership of the Security Council and therefore represents the most prominent example of the 
Council’s democratic deficit. Resolution 1373 played a substantial role in framing the debate on 
India’s anti-terrorism laws, which were consequently augmented by the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act 2002 (“POTA”)	  [9]. Upon the bill’s introduction to Parliament, Home Minister L.K. Advani 
asserted that the Security Council’s adoption of resolution 1373 rendered it India’s “duty to the 
international community…to pass [POTA].”	  [10] This view was echoed in civic society: retired 
Major General Ashok K. Mehta wrote in 2001 that, “All states are required by United Nations 
Security Council resolution 1373 to promulgate anti-terrorism laws within 90 days and report 
completion to the Secretary-General. POTA need not, therefore, be made such a big political 
issue.”	  [11] Even an opponent of the bill acknowledged that POTA was an obligation of 
international law.	  [12] POTA was therefore enacted against a backdrop of perceived Security 
Council coercion.
Since its enactment, POTA has become synonymous with human rights abuses and, in 2004, was 
the subject of a People’s Tribunal headed by former Law Minister Ram Jethmalani.	  [13] Among 
the tribunal’s findings were arbitrary enforcement by state governments; discrimination against 
Dalit and tribal communities; discrimination against religious minorities; violations of rights of 
free speech and association; malicious prosecution; police misconduct; unlawful preventative 
detention; and intimidation against lawyers.	  [14] Despite these findings, and a growing political 
controversy, international law obligations continued to cause concern during debates on repeal of 
the Act. It was stated in Parliament that India “had committed to the enactment of an anti-terror 
law” upon the Security Council’s adoption of resolution 1373, and that repeal might violate the 
resolution.	  [15] One Member of Parliament even stated that the UN had endorsed POTA.	  [16]
The reason for this statement was perhaps that, during the enactment of POTA, each of the 
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compliance reports which India is required to submit to the Counter Terrorism Committee 
(“CTC”) under resolution 1373 had implied that India’s anti-terrorism laws were required by the 
resolution.	  [17] The CTC has refrained from questioning whether member states’ descriptions of 
anti-terrorism laws are accurate and “…in failing to conceptualize its obligations with 
appropriate reference to maintaining fundamental human rights standards, the CTC may itself be 
prompting outcomes that are detrimental.”	  [18] Resolution 1373 does not explicitly refer to any 
human rights considerations in complying with the anti-terrorism provisions of the resolution and 
the CTC’s own legal expert has acknowledged that aspects of anti-terrorism laws enacted by 
states to comply with resolution 1373 would “not be fully compatible with human rights 
concerns”.	  [19] Accordingly, the CTC’s first chair, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, stated that, 
“Monitoring performance against other international conventions, including human rights law, is 
outside the scope of the [CTC’s] mandate.”	  [20]
The Security Council is therefore responsible for drafting a resolution which, when transposed 
into Indian domestic law, gave rise to serious human rights violations. Although subsequent 
resolutions have attempted to address human rights concerns,	  [21] this episode demonstrates the 
potential for damage to the reputation of the whole UN system when the Security Council 
attempts to draft and enact legislative resolutions. 
B. The Security Council as Judge
The second type of resolution which the Security Council has increasingly passed since the Cold 
War is exemplified by resolution 1390, which provide for ‘smart sanctions’ against individuals, 
particularly the freezing of funds of suspected terrorists linked to Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda or 
the Taliban, and requiring states to adopt appropriate measures against individuals designated by 
the UN Sanctions Committee.	  [22] This resolution, as incorporated into EU law by a Council 
Regulation[23], was the subject of judicial review before the ECJ in the landmark Kadi[24] case. 
The CFI held that, due to UN supremacy, established by Articles 25 and 103 of the Charter and 
incorporated into EU law by Article 307 EC, the Court could not indirectly review the Security 
Council by questioning the legality of the Regulation, unless the Regulation compelled member 
states to breach norms of jus cogens. The ECJ, however, rejected the CFI’s monist approach and 
held that the EU constitutes an “autonomous legal order”	  [26] in which the ECJ has jurisdiction 
to review Council Regulations, regardless of international agreement.	  [26]
Applying the facts of the case, the ECJ held that, by the inclusion of the appellants’ names on the 
sanctions list, the rights to be heard and to an effective remedy were “patently not 
respected”	  [27]. The latter required that the reasons for the measures and evidence against the 
applicant be communicated “within a reasonable period”, especially considering the severity of 
the complete loss of access to financial means to which listed persons are subject.	  [28] The 
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defendants sought to apply the German Federal Constitutional Court case Solange II[29], 
whereby the ECJ should defer to the UN, provided that the UN sufficiently protect human rights. 
The defendants submitted that fundamental rights were adequately protected by the UN 
Sanctions Committee re-examination procedure. Significantly, the ECJ considered the 
protections offered by the Sanctions Committee and, accordingly, “A future Solange deference 
therefore seems to be clearly possible if the remedies available at the UN level are 
reinforced.”	  [30] On the facts, however, the ECJ held that the remedies available were 
insufficient and, therefore, the resolution, as incorporated by the Regulation, breached EU law.
In rights-based legal jurisdictions, particularly the EU, judgments which condemn the Security 
Council for breaching human rights norms serve to question the legitimacy and unity of the UN 
system. ECJ condemnations are particularly damaging as “…the standards and values enforced 
by the ECJ are also those pursued by the international legal order.”	  [31] If Security Council 
resolutions are held to be unlawful in jurisdictions other than the EU, the uniform applicability 
and enforcement of international law emanating from the Council is threatened. Secretary-
General Annan was aware of the Security Council threat to the legitimacy of the UN system as a 
whole and, in 2006, cautioned that sanctions will only remain useful if they are effective and seen 
to be legitimate.	  [32]
Resolutions adopted in 2006 marked modest progress in requiring individuals to be informed of 
their designation on a list and outlining criteria to be considered in a request to be removed;	  [33] 
however, “None of these moves addressed the foundational concern that individuals were having 
their assets frozen without any formal process for review of how that decision was made, or the 
circumstances in which it could be revoked.”	  [34] That some states are hesitant to submit new 
names for inclusion on the sanctions lists is evidence that the legitimacy and unity of the UN 
system is still being challenged.	  [35] Accordingly, the consideration which the ECJ gave to the 
Solange II principle in Kadi should be seized as an opportunity by the UN to re-establish its 
legitimacy: if it passes resolutions conforming to human rights norms, national and regional 
courts are unlikely to challenge them; the universality of resolutions and of the UN system will 
therefore be upheld. 
II: Human Rights Limitations on the Security Council
There are, however, limited means available within the UN system to ensure that Security 
Council resolutions uphold human rights norms. The Security Council’s power derives 
substantially from Article 39, which gives it discretion to make determinations as to whether an 
act or situation constitutes a “threat to the peace”; “breach of the peace”; or “act of aggression”. 
Once such a determination is made, the Security Council may act to counter such challenge to 
international peace and security. Despite possessing the ability to decide its own jurisdiction, the 
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Security Council is not an organ with unlimited powers: it is limited by the Charter, by general 
international law and by jus cogens norms.
The principal limitation on the Security Council within the Charter is Article 24(2), which 
provides that, in maintaining international peace and security, the Security Council “shall act in 
accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations”. As one of the Purposes of 
the UN, Article 1(4) provides for international co-operation “in promoting and encouraging 
respect for human rights”. Article 55 similarly declares, “the United Nations shall promote…
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms…” There is, 
however, a lack of clarity as to which human rights the Security Council must respect. T.D. Gill 
has suggested, “the Council will at a minimum be bound by the rules of human rights contained 
in the International Bill of Rights from which no derogation is permitted in time of emergency 
and armed conflict”.	  [36] Dapo Akande submits that “…human rights norms which have entered 
into the corpus of general international law are binding on the Security Council and also that by 
Articles 1(4) and 55(c), human rights obligations (such as various human rights treaties) adopted 
within the United Nations system are binding on the Organisation even if they are not yet 
accepted by all member States”.	  [37] There is therefore no consensus as to human rights 
limitations on the Security Council’s powers.
The overwhelming problem with holding the Security Council to account, however, is that there 
is no sovereign authority to adjudicate and enforce the Security Council’s compliance with 
Charter and international law. The limitations on the Security Council have been insufficient to 
avoid regional organisations having serious misgivings about some of the resolutions passed. 
Such lack of accountability and recourse on the international plane is forcing individuals to seek 
judicial remedies in member states and regional organisations, thereby constituting a serious 
threat to the legitimacy and unity of the UN system. It is therefore vital that more active judicial 
intervention be considered as a serious proposal to limit the excesses of the Security Council.
III: A Way Forward
Since 9/11 and the resultant demand for action, the judiciary has played an important role in 
liberal democracies worldwide in preventing legislative excesses;	  [38] the ICJ has not acted as a 
corresponding limitation at the UN to the growing power of the Security Council.
A threshold consideration is whether current international law supports any form of judicial 
review. Neither the Charter nor the ICJ Statute directly addresses this question.	  [39] Since its 
inception, the ICJ has been equivocal over whether it has the power of judicial review, but 
Thomas M. Franck has argued famously that the 1992 Lockerbie case marks the point at which 
the ICJ established for itself judicial review powers analogous to those of the United States 
Supreme Court established in Marbury v. Madison.	  [40] 
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The Marbury analogy suggests that the ICJ has both concurrent jurisdiction with the Security 
Council and power to declare the Council’s resolutions ultra vires. In the 1962 Certain Expenses 
case, the ICJ held that it had authority to offer an opinion on whether peacekeeping costs 
constituted expenses “…‘decided on in conformity with the provisions of the Charter’, if the 
Court finds such consideration appropriate”.	  [41] In the 1970 Namibia case, the ICJ started from 
the premise that “the Court does not possess powers of judicial review or appeal in respect of the 
decisions taken by the United Nations organs concerned”, before ruling explicitly on the validity 
of the acts in question that the Security Council resolution was in accordance with the Charter.	  
[42] Indeed, Judge Dillard expressed a strong opinion that “it is not in the long-range interest of 
the United Nations to appear to be reluctant to have its resolutions stand the test of legal validity 
when it calls upon a court to determine issues to which this validity is related”	  [43].
Both Certain Expenses and Namibia therefore suggest that the ICJ has implicitly accepted that it 
may consider the validity of a Security Council resolution when giving an advisory opinion, 
which may be requested only by a UN organ.	  [44] Lockerbie is important because for the first 
time a significant proportion of the ICJ held that its power of judicial review also extends to 
contentious disputes between states and therefore may be binding on parties. It also suggests a 
growing acceptance by the ICJ that judicial review should not be limited only to when it is 
implicitly or explicitly requested by a UN organ as to the legal effect of that organ’s acts.	  [45] 
While in the Lockerbie majority opinion, the court did not have the opportunity to rule 
conclusively that it had ultra vires review powers,	  [46] in Namibia Judge de Castro had stated 
explicitly that, “the Court, as a legal organ, cannot cooperate with a resolution which is clearly 
void, contrary to the rules of the Charter, or contrary to the principles of law.”	  [47] Thus, Certain 
Expenses, Namibia and Lockerbie confirm that the ICJ may, in principle, review the legality of a 
resolution.
Standing, however, is a major obstacle for a more interventionist court. In this crucial aspect, the 
Marbury analogy does not hold because neither an individual, nor a state, can bring a case of 
judicial review at will. Article 96(a) provides that, “The General Assembly or the Security 
Council may request the [ICJ] to give an advisory opinion on any legal question”. Clearly, the 
Security Council cannot be relied upon to challenge its own resolutions at the ICJ. The General 
Assembly therefore has a responsibility to challenge the legality of Security Council resolutions, 
which threaten the legitimacy, and unity of the UN system.
Assuming the General Assembly request an advisory opinion, the ICJ may answer only insofar as 
it is a “legal question”.	  [48] Controversy exists as to whether measures taken under Chapter VII, 
relating to the Security Council’s determining “the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression”	  [49] can be properly described as a legal question upon which the 
ICJ may express an opinion. In his dissenting opinion in Lockerbie, Judge Weeramantry 
attempted to address this question by distinguishing between those resolutions taken under 
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Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. The judge held that the ICJ had power to review the legality 
of resolution 731 as it was passed under Chapter VI of the Charter;	  [50] conversely, he 
acknowledged that resolution 748 was explicitly passed under Chapter VII and that “the Council 
and no other is the judge of the existence of affairs which brings Chapter VII into operation”.	  
[51] Furthermore, Judge Weeamantry noted that when Chapter VII is in operation “…the door is 
opened to the various decisions the Council may take under the Chapter”.	  [52]
It is important to distinguish between the two parts of Article 39: the determination of the 
existence of an international crisis and measures taken in response thereto.	  [53] It is submitted 
that, while the existence of a threat is a political decision which the Security Council is best 
placed to make, the ICJ can serve a constructive role in ensuring the Security Council’s responses 
in the resolutions it passes do not undermine the Purposes and Principles upon which the UN 
system is founded. It is probable that the ICJ could develop jurisprudentially a series of legal 
tests, particularly proportionality, to prevent the Security Council undermining the legitimacy of 
the UN.	  [54]
On a strictly legal basis, the effect of an ICJ decision that the Security Council resolution is ultra 
vires would be limited. If the decision arose in response to an ad hoc General Assembly request 
for judicial review under Article 96, it would, like any other advisory opinion, have no binding 
effect. The ICJ has no judicial review powers in the sense of authority to quash Security Council 
resolutions.	  [55] Moreover, the ICJ did not inherit the common law doctrine of stare decisis, 
which ensures that a ruling of unconstitutionality in practice becomes binding in future cases.	  
[56]
These ICJ limitations suggest that it does not have powers of judicial supremacy analogous to the 
contemporaneous powers of the United States Supreme Court. A better analogy is with the 
traditional ‘Jeffersonian’ doctrine of concurrent review whereby no single UN organ has the final 
say on interpretation of the Charter and that the legal opinion of the Court should be respected in 
the case it resolves but not necessarily in future cases.	  [57] This interpretation sits better with the 
Charter and with the generally respected reasoning expressed previously in Certain Expenses that 
“each organ must, in the first place at least, determine its own jurisdiction.”	  [58]
The reality of the relationship of UN organs is of complementary institutions functioning in 
“fruitful interaction” rather than of political organs subject to judicial supremacy.	  [59] The UK’s 
long held doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is analogous to the Security Council in that 
Parliament determines its own jurisdiction. However, the ECHR requires that Parliament not pass 
laws which undermine its enumerated human rights. A compromise reached by section 4, HRA 
1998 is that, if an Act of Parliament is fundamentally incompatible with the ECHR, UK courts 
will issue a declaration of incompatibility. These are non-binding opinions, which state that the 
UK is in breach of the values it is committed to upholding. It is then the right of Parliament to 
bring the law into conformity with the ECHR.
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Applying this model to the UN system, a declaration that the Security Council is acting ultra 
vires, or even the threat thereof, would have significant influence on Council resolutions 
regardless of its binding effect. Given that the Security Council has no autonomous enforcement 
powers, it relies on maintaining the confidence of member states. The Bosnia Genocide case 
demonstrates how easily the Security Council and the UN as a whole can be undermined if its 
resolutions are deemed illegal and illegitimate.	  [60] Indeed, as Jose Alzarez notes, “given the 
level of compliance with the Court’s advisory opinions and the difficulty of enforcing its 
contentious judgments, the Council’s options might, in practical terms, be as constrained by an 
advisory opinion as they would be by an adverse decision in a case like Lockerbie.”	  [61] The 
General Assembly, if it is serious about defending the interests of the UN system, should 
therefore request, either directly or through the HRC, that the ICJ judicially review Security 
Council resolutions such as 1373 and 1390.
Conclusion
Whereas the Security Council’s Cold War history was defined by deadlock, its post 9/11 histories 
is currently defined by its unprecedented expansion. Unchecked power in the hands of the 
Security Council has allowed anti-terrorism resolutions to be passed which not only undermine 
the legitimacy and unity of the UN system in the international legal order, but which could be 
counter-productive to the Council’s own aims. Placing questions of interference with individual 
autonomy on the legal plane reinforces the gravity of the consequences of Security Council 
resolutions which fail to give due regard to human rights: “[l]egal language carries, virtually in 
ossibus, the idea of legal restraints.”	  [62] That member states take seriously the question of 
legality is demonstrated by the angry reaction of the US government to Secretary-General 
Annan’s unilateral declaration that the Iraq war was “illegal”.	  [63] Kadi indicates that regional 
organisations will not submit to the derogation of fundamental rights. If the UN system fails to 
acknowledge this, it is likely to conflict with member states, some of which it is dependent upon 
for its continued effectiveness, and consequently UN law will fragment across member states, to 
the detriment of international anti-terrorism.
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